Interest rates and inflation - Keep rising?

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Today . . . Right now



Treasury Yields

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NAME	COUPON	PRICE	YIELD
GB3:GOV 3 Month	0.00	2.51	2.56%
GB6:GOV 6 Month	0.00	3.01	3.10%
GB12:GOV 12 Month	0.00	3.13	3.25%
GT2:GOV 2 Year	3.00	99.49	3.27%
GT5:GOV 5 Year	2.75	99.03	2.96%
GT10:GOV 10 Year	2.88	100.83	2.78%
GT30:GOV 30 Year	2.88	97.75	2.99%



Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)

NAME	COUPON	PRICE	YIELD	
GTII5:GOV 5 Year	0.13	99.25	0.29%	
GTII10:GOV 10 Year	0 .63	103.06	0.31%	
GTII20:GOV 20 Year	0.75	97.50	0.89%	
GTII30:GOV 30 Year	0.13	82.65	0.78%	



- Year-over-year
- Consumer Price Index

• 8.5%



Context is necessary

Long-run history

Interest rates - details





Interest rates - the cycles





Interest rates - the cycles





Interest rates . . . Now rise for *"19.9 years"*

Like they've always done

Inflation - the details

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Inflation - the cycles





Inflation - the cycles





Inflation . . . Now rises for *"17.5 years"*

Like its always done



If we just "accept" history

Take history as the forward-looking forecast A good/best starting point



Bottomed out

- July 2020
- At -2.93% . . . Inflation-adjusted . . . Note, that is a negative interest rate
- Typical cycle
 - Runs for 19.9 years
 - Moves interest rates by 1214bps
- If history repeats (the best possible starting point) . . . interest rates will peak
 - On June 2040
 - At 9.21% . . . Inflation-adjusted
 - Is this "heroic"? Nope . . . This would be normal, vanilla, boring . . . and typical



Bear markets for inflation-adjusted U.S. bonds since 1845

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
	-22	2.67	Mar 1863	Nov 1865	6.1	31	-9.1
	-50	11.42	Dec 1908	May 1920	4.8	41	-5.9
	-31	16.58	Jan 1941	Aug 1957	3.3	45	-2.2
	-40	16.33	May 1965	Sep 1981	6.4	45	-3.0
	?	?	Jul 2020	?	?	?	?
Median BEAR market	-35	13.87			5.4	43	-4.5
Mean BEAR market	-36	11.75			5.1	40	-5.0

Author: Rob Brown, PhD, CFA at www.robbrownonline.com. Statistics based on data provided by Global Financial Data, Inc., at https://finaeon.globalfinancial data.com and are current as of July 15, 2022

Bonds were defined as 50% intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bonds and 50% liquid high-quality U.S. corporate bonds. And were constructed using three total returm bond indices provided by Global Financial Data. Intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bonds are defined by the GFD Indices USA 10-year Government Bond Total Returm Index. Prior to 4/30/1915 liquid high-quality U.S. corporate bonds are defined by the GFD Indices USA Total Returm AAA Corporate Bond Index. After 4/30/1915 liquid high-quality U.S. corporate Bond Returm Index and the GFD Indices USA Total Returm AAA Corporate Bond Index.

Results rely on month-end total returns adjusted for the All Urban Consumers Not Seasonally Adjusted Consumer Price Index as provided by the U.S. Department of Labor. Indices are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. Unmanaged index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or sales charges. Index performance is not indicative of the performance of any investment. Past performance is no guarantee of future results

Bear and bull markets are defined as moves of at least 20.95730035% using month-end bond index total returns. This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made. Investment advice offered through Integrated Wealth Concepts LLC (a Registered Investment Adviser), d/b/a Integrated Financial Partners, Inc. For internal use only, do not share with clients or prospects



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?	?	Jul 2020	?	?	?	?

Median BEAR market





And inflation ?



Bottomed out

- Jan 2012
- At 1.17%
- Typical cycle
 - Runs for 17.5 years
 - Moves inflation YOY by 1012bps
- If history repeats (the <u>best</u> possible starting point) . . . inflation will peak
 - On July 2029
 - At 11.29% . . . YOY (year-over-year)
 - Is this "heroic"? Nope . . . This would be normal, vanilla, boring, and seriously typical
 - RECALL . . . inflation hit a high of 14.8% on Mar 1980 YOY



Important qualifications

Drawn from today's . . . quite serious realities



- It's all about COVID
- And the US government's response to COVID
- And many other country's . . . respective responses to COVID
- We seriously need to modify our history-based conclusions for the once-in-ahundred-year event of COVID
- I struggle to see . . . how this has anything to do with "long-run" interest rates
- BUT . . . It has serious implications for inflation



- Why is inflation happening . . .
 - COVID
 - Millions left the labor force . . . stopped working
 - The global supply chain broke . . . and it takes years (not months) to reconnect it
 - Consumers got bored . . . and just started buying stuff . . . a lot of stuff
 - Federal government stimulus
 - Monetary by Federal Reserve
 - Fiscal spending by the US Congress
 - Ukraine
 - Deglobalization



- It goes <u>down</u> . . . Big time
- Security markets are forecasting inflation to <u>AVERAGE</u> just
 - 2.7 % over the <u>next</u> five years
 - 2.5% over the <u>next</u> ten years



- Why must inflation fall from current levels?
 - COVID
 - Millions left the labor force . . . stopped working
 - The global supply chain broke . . . and it takes years (not months) to reconnect it
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These two factors are working hard to drive inflation higher For internal use only, do not share with clients or prospects These five factors are all working in reverse, serving to push inflation back down



But why?

It's always necessary to ask and adequately answer the question of "why?"



- It's all about funding (paying for) . . . projects . . . that're at play
- Society and governments have several projects that they're attempting to finance
 - Cold war with Russia
 - Cold war with China
 - Conversion from fossil fuels to renewables
 - Income inequality gap
 - Wealth inequality gap
 - Expanding social welfare programs
 - Transitioning from one political structure . . . To a different structure
- Inflation is a method for both obscuring the cost . . . and dispersing its burden
- My 2 cents . . . The French revolution (reign of terror) of the late 18th century . . . Is helpful



Rob's interpretation

Let's try to start with a healthy dose of humility



- We need to adjust for COVID
- And governmental responses (US and Int'l) to COVID
- Without this adjustment . . . Any view is delusionary
- Interest rates
 - Temporarily suppressed
- Inflation
 - Seriously . . . But temporarily distorted . . . To the upside
 - BUT . . . It's complex . . . And nuanced



- Comes down quickly
- Returns to "normal"
- But is temporarily distorted by all-things COVID
- Once it returns to normal . . . (pre COVID) . . . It climbs and reaches a high about 2029



- Grounded in history
- And not in crystal ball gazing

Interest rates peak in 2040 at 9% (inflation <u>adjusted</u>)

Inflation YOY peaks in 2029 at 11% YOY



- Just stop
- Just stop
- This has absolutely zero to do with which political party gains dominance
- The forces at play are far far larger than any political differences . . . Which honestly are trivial



What's to be done

OK . . . So maybe just a couple of ideas . . . 2 cents



• The old irrelevant approach is <u>dead</u> . . . For goodness sake, just admit it's dead

- MPT Modern Portfolio Theory
- Mean variance optimization
- 60/40 portfolio
- See the very nice piece on this by GMO . . . out of Boston

• What works . . . What's needed

- Tactical asset allocation (TAA)
- Serious, institutional, well-structured . . . alternative investments . . . If it's offered at a B/D it <u>won't</u> work







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Alternative Investments - The good, the bad, and the ugly

Friday

Aug 19th

11:00 a.m. EASTERN



All data and statistics were provided by Ycharts, Global Financial Data, Inc., and NDR, Inc. (unless otherwise indicated in the exhibit)

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