



# Explaining tactical asset allocation to a client

**Rob Brown, PhD, CFA**

**Julex Capital Advisory Board Member, Website [www.robbrownonline.com](http://www.robbrownonline.com)**



**40 Grove Street, Suite 140, Wellesley, MA 02482**

**Phone 781-489-5398**

**Email [info@julexcapital.com](mailto:info@julexcapital.com)**

**Web [www.julexcapital.com](http://www.julexcapital.com)**

- Avoid any discussion of “*how it works*” or “*what it does*”
- Stay out of the engine room
- Instead . . . focus on
- How is today different , , , and use that as a tool to describe the need
- Describe the benefits

# The nature of change

95% of the time it's about speed or pace

## The “95% of the time”

About . . . speed or pace

Best possible approach

See what worked best in the past and modify it at the edges to reflect current day realities

## The “5% of the time”

About . . . direction

Worst possible approach

See what worked best in the past and modify it at the edges to reflect current day realities

Guarantees faceplant

# Speed of change - An example of the 95%



SLOW

FAST



# When was the last time we had directional change?


Maybe the 1970s?

NO . . . . probably not




- OPEC oil embargos to the U.S.
- 1973 Arab-Israeli War
- Race Riots in most major cities
- Unemployment rising to highest level since The Great Depression
- Interest rates hit 16 ½%
- Series of three economic recessions
- Black Monday (Oct 1987) when the market fell -25% in just 120 minutes
- Highest inflation in over 100 years
- Oil rose 1,140% in just over nine years
- Regan revolution that transformed American politics










# The last time we had directional change


Was probably the broadly-defined WWII era

### 1929-1946

- Great Depression of 1929
- World War II
- Eight-year drought - The Dust Bowl
- ENIAC began the computer revolution
- A scalable market for U.S. Treasury bonds was developed



- 
- Large and rapidly growing economy
  - Relatively separate from the rest of the world, endeavoring to remain apart and uninvolved

- 
- Leader of the Free World
  - Major provider of capital to other nations
  - Nation builder

- Fossil to renewables
- Haves versus the have-nots
- China cold war
- Velocity of money
- Interest rates
- Fundamental intrinsic valuations *(on stocks, bonds, and trophy real estate)*

- Zombies
- Weather and demographics
- Suppression of creative destruction *(undermining evolution, renewal, and future opportunity)*
- European war
- Reinvention of four industries *(Transportation, Medicine, Energy, Digital finance and contracting)*
- An “Andrew Jackson-like” governmental regression
- Deglobalization



- Because you
  - Appreciate that you can only invest in the future . . . and not in the past
  - Recognize that the future is all about
    - **Directional change** . . . instead of a **change in terms of speed or pace**
    - Highest level of uncertainty since WWII era
  - Appreciate that it's impossible to know what will work in the future (with sufficient accuracy)
    - Therefore you require something that starts from a position of absolute humility . . .
    - But adapts continuously and unrelentingly seeking to stay best-aligned

# I don't want to lose it all . . . not now

This becomes the defining element . . .

Especially given today's ultra-high uncertainty

- Worked hard
- Built a nest egg
- Not willing to lose it now
- BUT
  - Also not willing to have it nibbled all away over the next “35 years” by
    - Taxes
    - Inflation
    - Fees

# Motivation is not return . . . it's risk . . . the what ifs

- Euro war
- Taiwan war
- 2<sup>nd</sup> pandemic . . . future variants
- Inflation returns to 14%
- Interest rates return to 16 ½%
- Oil hits \$200
- P/E ratio (Price/Earnings ratio) returns to its 1981 level . . . . stocks fall -60%
- Return of a political “Andrew Jackson” type environment
  - Cut government in half
  - Shut down monetary authorities
  - No more immigrants
  - We get an incredibly serious DEPRESSION

- Worked hard
- Built a nest egg
- Not willing to lose it now
- BUT
  - Also not willing to have it nibbled all away over the next “35 years” by
    - Taxes
    - Inflation
    - Fees

**And I recognize that bear markets  
do come around . . . Bad things do  
happen**



Bear markets for inflation-adjusted U.S. stocks since 1846

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
	-30	1.25	Aug 1853	Nov 1854	27.6	27	-25.1
	-31	0.83	Dec 1856	Oct 1857	19.2	10	-36.4
	-35	0.67	Jul 1864	Mar 1865	32.4	38	-47.1
	-32	1.25	Mar 1876	Jun 1877	7.8	7	-26.2
	-37	1.17	Sep 1906	Nov 1907	13.8	14	-32.7
	-27	2.00	Oct 1912	Oct 1914	11.0	38	-14.8
	-48	4.08	Nov 1916	Dec 1920	15.9	41	-14.8
	-79	2.75	Aug 1929	May 1932	37.3	36	-43.7
	-50	1.08	Feb 1937	Mar 1938	31.6	23	-47.1
	-39	2.58	Sep 1939	Apr 1942	19.3	42	-17.3
	-37	1.75	May 1946	Feb 1948	14.5	29	-23.4
	-35	1.58	Nov 1968	Jun 1970	14.8	26	-24.1
	-52	1.75	Dec 1972	Sep 1974	15.2	14	-34.2
	-30	0.25	Aug 1987	Nov 1987	33.9	0	-76.3
	-47	2.08	Aug 2000	Sep 2002	17.8	36	-26.4
	-52	1.33	Oct 2007	Feb 2009	19.2	25	-42.1
	?	?	Aug 2021	?	?	?	?
Median BEAR market	-37	1.46			18.5	26	-29.6
Mean BEAR market	-41	1.65			20.7	25	-33.2

Author: Rob Brown, PhD, CFA at [www.robrownonline.com](http://www.robrownonline.com). Statistics based on data provided by Global Financial Data, Inc., San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675, at <https://finaeonglobalfinancialdata.com> and are current as of October 15, 2021

Results rely on month-end S&P 500 Index total returns adjusted for the All Urban Consumers Not Seasonally Adjusted Consumer Price Index as provided by the U.S. Department of Labor




Indices are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. Unmanaged index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or sales charges. Index performance is not indicative of the performance of any investment. Past performance is no guarantee of future results

Bull and bear markets are defined as moves of at least 26.92993% using month-end S&P 500 Index total returns. This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made. Investment advice offered through Integrated Wealth Concepts LLC (a Registered Investment Adviser), d/b/a Integrated Financial Partners, Inc.

For internal use only

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
Median BEAR market	-37	1.46			18.5	26	-29.6
Mean BEAR market	-41	1.65			20.7	25	-33.2

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
Median BEAR market	-37	1.46			18.5	26	-29.6
Mean BEAR market	-41	1.65			20.7	25	-33.2



Bear markets for inflation-adjusted U.S. bonds since 1845

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
	-22	2.67	Mar 1863	Nov 1865	6.1	31	-9.1
	-50	11.42	Dec 1908	May 1920	4.8	41	-5.9
	-31	16.58	Jan 1941	Aug 1957	3.3	45	-2.2
	-40	16.33	May 1965	Sep 1981	6.4	45	-3.0
	?	?	Jul 2020	?	?	?	?
Median BEAR market	-35	13.87			5.4	43	-4.5
Mean BEAR market	-36	11.75			5.1	40	-5.0

Author: Rob Brown, PhD, CFA at [www.robrownonline.com](http://www.robrownonline.com). Statistics based on data provided by Global Financial Data, Inc., San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675, at <https://finaeon.globalfinancialdata.com> and are current as of October 15, 2021

Bonds were defined as 50%intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bonds and 50%liquid high-quality U.S. corporate bonds. And were constructed using three total return bond indices provided by Global Financial Data. Intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bonds are defined by the GFD Indices USA 10-year Government Bond Total Return Index. Prior to 4/30/1915 liquid high-quality U.S. corporate bonds are defined by the GFD Indices USA Total Return AAA Corporate Bond Index. After 4/30/1915 liquid high-quality U.S. corporate bonds are defined by a 50/50 mix of the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Return Index and the GFD Indices USA Total Return AAA Corporate Bond Index

Results rely on month-end total returns adjusted for the All Urban Consumers Not Seasonally Adjusted Consumer Price Index as provided by the U.S. Department of Labor. Indices are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. Unmanaged index returns do not reflect fees, expenses, or sales charges. Index performance is not indicative of the performance of any investment. Past performance is no guarantee of future results

Bear and bull markets are defined as moves of at least 20.95730035% using month-end S&P 500 Index total returns. This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made. Investment advice offered through Integrated Wealth Concepts LLC (a Registered Investment Adviser), d/b/a Integrated Financial Partners, Inc.




## Bear markets for inflation-adjusted U.S. bonds since 1845

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
Median BEAR market	-35	13.87			5.4	43	-4.5
Mean BEAR market	-36	11.75			5.1	40	-5.0


Bear markets for inflation-adjusted U.S. bonds since 1845

	Cumulative percentage return, unannualized	Duration in years	Start date	End date	Volatility, annualized standard deviation of monthly returns	Percentage of monthly returns that were POSITIVE	Annualized return during BEAR market
Median BEAR market	-35	13.87			5.4	43	-4.5
Mean BEAR market	-36	11.75			5.1	40	-5.0


# We do have economic recessions



# And inflation does run in cycles . . . Rising or falling



# The same is true of interest rates







# We need an approach which adapts

One that doesn't say . . . . just wait it out

# The Great Economic Recession . . . of 2007-2009




# But how did it generate such an attractive outcome?



# Rely on the collateral pieces

Annual brochure

Monthly updates



# Current positioning


Table 1: Dynamic Series Model Portfolios (April 1, 2022)

ETF	Name	Years 21+	Years 16-20	Years 11-15	Years 6-10
<b>XLB</b>	Materials Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLE</b>	Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund	7.50%	6.75%	6.00%	5.25%
<b>XLF</b>	Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLI</b>	Industrial Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLK</b>	Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLP</b>	Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLU</b>	Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund	7.50%	6.75%	6.00%	5.25%
<b>XLV</b>	Health Care Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLY</b>	Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLRE</b>	Real Estate Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLC</b>	Communication Services Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>IBB</b>	iShares NASDAQ Biotechnology ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>KBE</b>	SPDR S&P Bank ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>FDN</b>	FT Internet	-	-	-	-
<b>IGV</b>	iShares Expanded Tech-Software Sector ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SOXX</b>	iShares PHLX Semiconductor ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPYV</b>	SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPYG</b>	SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWS</b>	iShares Russell Mid-Cap Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWP</b>	iShares Russell Mid-Cap Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWN</b>	iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWO</b>	iShares Russell 2000 Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPY</b>	SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust	15.00%	13.50%	12.00%	10.50%
<b>EWA</b>	iShares MSCI Australia ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWC</b>	iShares MSCI Canada ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWD</b>	iShares MSCI Sweden ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWG</b>	iShares MSCI Germany ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWH</b>	iShares MSCI Hong Kong ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWI</b>	iShares MSCI Italy ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWJ</b>	iShares MSCI Japan ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWL</b>	iShares MSCI Switzerland ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWN</b>	iShares MSCI Netherlands ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWP</b>	iShares MSCI Spain ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWQ</b>	iShares MSCI France ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWS</b>	iShares MSCI Singapore ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWU</b>	iShares MSCI United Kingdom ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>DEM</b>	WisdomTree Emerging Markets High Dividend	-	-	-	-
<b>EPI</b>	WisdomTree India Earnings Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>EWT</b>	iShares MSCI Taiwan ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWV</b>	iShares MSCI Mexico ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWY</b>	iShares MSCI South Korea ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWZ</b>	iShares MSCI Brazil ETF	10.00%	9.00%	8.00%	7.00%
<b>FXI</b>	iShares China Large-Cap ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>RSX</b>	VanEck Vectors Russia ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EEM</b>	iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>AGG</b>	iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF	-	5.00%	10.00%	15.00%
<b>TIP</b>	iShares TIPS Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IEF</b>	iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	5.00%	10.00%	15.00%
<b>TLT</b>	iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SHY</b>	iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SHV</b>	iShares Short Treasury Bond ETF	60.00%	54.00%	48.00%	42.00%
<b>LQD</b>	iShares IBOXX Investment Grade Corp	-	-	-	-

## Current positioning - zoom in a little

ETF	Name	Years 21+	Years 16-20	Years 11-15	Years 6-10
<b>XLB</b>	Materials Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLE</b>	Energy Select Sector SPDR Fund	7.50%	6.75%	6.00%	5.25%
<b>XLF</b>	Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLI</b>	Industrial Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLK</b>	Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLP</b>	Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLU</b>	Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund	7.50%	6.75%	6.00%	5.25%
<b>XLV</b>	Health Care Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLY</b>	Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLRE</b>	Real Estate Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>XLC</b>	Communication Services Select Sector SPDR Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>IBB</b>	iShares NASDAQ Biotechnology ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>KBE</b>	SPDR S&P Bank ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>FDN</b>	FT Internet	-	-	-	-
<b>IGV</b>	iShares Expanded Tech-Software Sector ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SOXX</b>	iShares PHLX Semiconductor ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPYV</b>	SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPYG</b>	SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWS</b>	iShares Russell Mid-Cap Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWP</b>	iShares Russell Mid-Cap Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWN</b>	iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IWO</b>	iShares Russell 2000 Growth ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SPY</b>	SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust	15.00%	13.50%	12.00%	10.50%
<b>EWA</b>	iShares MSCI Australia ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWC</b>	iShares MSCI Canada ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWD</b>	iShares MSCI Sweden ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWG</b>	iShares MSCI Germany ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWH</b>	iShares MSCI Hong Kong ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWI</b>	iShares MSCI Italy ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWJ</b>	iShares MSCI Japan ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWL</b>	iShares MSCI Switzerland ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWN</b>	iShares MSCI Netherlands ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWP</b>	iShares MSCI Spain ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWQ</b>	iShares MSCI France ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWS</b>	iShares MSCI Singapore ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWU</b>	iShares MSCI United Kingdom ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>DEM</b>	WisdomTree Emerging Markets High Dividend	-	-	-	-
<b>EPI</b>	WisdomTree India Earnings Fund	-	-	-	-
<b>EWT</b>	iShares MSCI Taiwan ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWW</b>	iShares MSCI Mexico ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWY</b>	iShares MSCI South Korea ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EWZ</b>	iShares MSCI Brazil ETF	10.00%	9.00%	8.00%	7.00%
<b>FXI</b>	iShares China Large-Cap ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>RSX</b>	VanEck Vectors Russia ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>EEM</b>	iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>AGG</b>	iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF	-	5.00%	10.00%	15.00%
<b>TIP</b>	iShares TIPS Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>IEF</b>	iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	5.00%	10.00%	15.00%
<b>TLT</b>	iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SHY</b>	iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF	-	-	-	-
<b>SHV</b>	iShares Short Treasury Bond ETF	60.00%	54.00%	48.00%	42.00%

# Who is Julex Capital







**JULEX CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC**, founded in 2012, is an investment management firm dedicated to creating innovative solutions in the areas of tactical asset allocation and quantitative investing. Julex's mission is to help investors reach their financial goals by delivering attractive performance at a reasonable cost through a systematic and transparent investment process.

## OUR PRODUCTS

### Tactical ETF Strategies

Julex Capital offers a variety of tactical ETF strategies aiming to limit the downside risk while maximizing the upside potentials. The strategies strive to deliver attractive total returns regardless of market conditions.

### Quantitative Equity Strategies

Julex Capital offers factor-based quantitative equity strategies based on its TrueAlpha™ stock selection model. The goal is to generate excess return ("alpha") over an index by investing in a concentrated portfolio of 20-40 undervalued high-quality stocks.

### Equity Income Strategies

Julex Capital offers equity income strategies based on a multi-factor approach. The goal is to generate above average dividend income and long-term capital growth by investing in a concentrated portfolio of high dividend or real estate stocks. Our multi-factor model combines size, value, quality and momentum to generate consistent excess returns. In addition, Julex provides a proprietary option overlay strategy to enhance income for any portfolio.

### Portfolio Solutions

Julex Capital offers global asset allocation solutions designed to meet specific investment objectives. We combine appropriate core asset class ETFs with Julex Capital's tactical ETF strategies into "all-in-one" investment solutions. Risk-based solutions aim to provide portfolios for varying investor risk tolerance levels. The goal-based solutions aim to provide portfolios for varying investment horizons targeting specific returns objectives.

### TACTICAL ETF STRATEGIES

- Dynamic Sector
- Dynamic Income
- Dynamic Multi-Asset
- Dynamic Developed Market
- Dynamic Real Asset

### QUANTITATIVE EQUITY STRATEGIES

- TrueAlpha™ Large Cap
- TrueAlpha™ ESG
- TrueAlpha™ Small Cap

### EQUITY INCOME STRATEGIES

- Multi Factor Real Estate
- High Dividend
- Option Overlays

### RISK BASED SOLUTIONS

- Dynamic Aggressive
- Dynamic Moderate
- Dynamic Conservative
- Dynamic Defensive

### GOAL BASED SOLUTIONS

- Destination 0-5 Years - 3%
- Destination 6-10 Years - 4%
- Destination 11-15 Years - 5%
- Destination 16-20 Years - 6%
- Destination 21+ Years - 7%

#### Overview

- Global asset allocation strategies designed to deliver target returns to investors at defined destinations. The strategies are tactically positioned in both domestic and international equity and fixed-income ETFs.

#### Objectives

- Maximize the probability of achieving a given return within a given time frame.
- Use unique RiskSwitch indicator and proprietary trend model to manage downside risk.

#### Facts

**Inception Date:**  
06/01/2019

**Portfolio Manager:**  
Henry Ma, Ph. D., CFA

#### Investment Process

Julex uses a trend-following model to determine its position internationally, and an adaptive economic model to determine its position domestically. 40% of the strategy uses the international model, and the remaining 60% uses the domestic model. The strategy trades twice a month, and holds between 20 and 40 positions at a time.



#### Model Performance Through 12/31/2021 (USD)

	Target Return (Ann.)	Time frame (Years)	1-mo	3-mo	6-mo	12-mo	Since Inc. (Ann.)
Dynamic Series 5	7%	21	2.67%	5.90%	2.55%	9.88%	8.94%
Dynamic Series 4	6%	16-20	2.36%	5.32%	2.33%	8.62%	8.50%
Dynamic Series 3	5%	11-15	2.05%	4.74%	2.10%	7.37%	8.04%
Dynamic Series 2	4%	6-10	1.74%	4.15%	1.86%	6.12%	7.55%

**Note:** The Dynamic Series performance above is a live record of the Julex composite (in the case of Destination 5), and model performance (in the cases of Destinations 2-4). The returns on a client account may be different due to the timing of trading and transaction costs. Performance is historical and does not guarantee future results. Account level performance may be higher or lower than the Composites. Returns include the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. See "Disclosure" for more important information.

## Hypothetical Back Test Results

Sept. 2003- May 2019	Dynamic Series 5	Dynamic Series 4	Dynamic Series 3	Dynamic Series 2
2003 (Sept-Dec)	14.6%	13.4%	12.2%	11.0%
2004	8.8%	8.4%	7.9%	7.4%
2005	16.0%	14.5%	13.1%	11.7%
2006	10.8%	10.1%	9.4%	8.7%
2007	13.7%	13.5%	13.2%	13.0%
2008	-1.2%	-0.5%	0.2%	0.8%
2009	18.9%	17.4%	15.9%	14.4%
2010	27.6%	25.3%	22.9%	20.6%
2011	2.0%	2.8%	3.6%	4.4%
2012	17.6%	16.0%	14.4%	12.8%
2013	20.1%	17.8%	15.7%	13.5%
2014	8.9%	9.0%	8.9%	8.9%
2015	2.7%	2.5%	2.2%	2.0%
2016	16.0%	14.3%	12.6%	10.9%
2017	28.8%	25.8%	22.8%	19.9%
2018	-1.7%	-1.2%	-0.7%	-0.2%
2019 (Jan-May)	3.2%	3.4%	3.6%	3.8%

Julex Capital Management, LLC (Julex) is an independent investment management firm registered in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that is not affiliated with any parent organization. Julex Capital Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

### Disclosures

This fact sheet is for the purpose of information exchange. This is not a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. You must do your own due diligence and consult a professional investment advisor before making any investment decisions. The use of a proprietary technique, model or algorithm does not guarantee any specific profitable results. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. The performance data presented are gross returns. The risk of loss in trading securities can be substantial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of your financial condition. All information posted is believed to come from reliable sources. We do not warrant the accuracy or completeness of information made available and therefore will not be liable for any losses incurred.

The investment performance shown on this page for the Dynamic Series is HYPOTHETICAL. It is based on the back tests of historical data. Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profit or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program.

One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

### Note on Data

In the back test, we used the index returns in case the historical returns of the ETFs are not long enough. The ETF returns were approximated by index returns subtracted by their respective expense ratios. The following summarizes the detailed calculations: (1) IWM: Russell 2000 Index - 20bps before 5/20/2000; (2) EFA: MSCI EAFE Index - 34bps before 8/28/2001; (3) VWX: MSCI EM Index - 15bps before 4/29/2006; (4) VNO: MSCI US REIT Index - 10bps before 10/29/2004; (5) MLP: Alerion MLP Infrastructure Index - 85bps before 5/28/2010; (6) GLD: London Gold Fixing - 40bps before 12/31/2004; (7) JNK: Bloomberg Capital US High Yield Index - 40bps before 1/31/2008; (8) AGG: Bloomberg Capital US Aggregate Index - 8bps before 10/31/2003; (9) TLT: Bloomberg Capital US Treasury Index - 15bps before 8/30/2002; (10) TLT: Bloomberg Capital 20+ year US Treasury Index - 15bps before 8/30/2002; (11) SHV: Three month T-Bill before 02/28/2007; (12) DXY: Dow Jones US Select Dividend Index - 38bps before 12/31/2003; (13) EMB: JP Morgan EMB Global Core Index - 80bps before 1/31/2006; (14) PFF: S&P US Preferred Index - 47bps before 4/30/2007; (15) BKLN: S&P/LSTA Bank Loan Index - 65bps before 4/28/2001; (16) NYE: S&P 500 Value Index - 18bps before 6/30/2000; (17) IWM: S&P 500 Growth Index - 18bps before 6/30/2000; (18) IWS: Russell MidCap Value Index - 25bps before 8/28/2001; (19) IWP: Russell MidCap Growth Index - 25bps before 8/28/2001; (20) IWK: Russell SmallCap Value Index - 25bps before 8/28/2001; (21) IWG: Russell SmallCap Growth Index - 25bps before 8/28/2001; (22) DJP: Dow Jones US Commodity Index - 75bps before 10/30/2006; (23) RWX: Dow Jones Global Real Estate Index - 59bps before 9/30/2007 (Source: Bloomberg, Yahoo, Julex Capital)

The composition of a benchmark index may not reflect the manner in which a Julex portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, investment holdings, portfolio guidelines, restrictions, sectors, correlations, concentrations, volatility, or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time. No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made or that all assumptions used to construct the performance provided have been stated or fully considered.

# Two additional pieces

But only for the “technical types” . . . . Or those who just “need paper”

# The Journal of Portfolio Management

VOLUME 44, NUMBER 1

[www.ijpm.com](http://www.ijpm.com)

FALL 2017

**A Century of Evidence  
on Trend-Following Investing**

## Winners Repeat, Losers Repeat

Rob Brown

Rob Brown

Is the chief investment officer and a senior vice president at Integrated Financial Partners and Integrated Wealth Concepts in Waltham, MA.

[rob.brown@ifpadvisor.com](mailto:rob.brown@ifpadvisor.com)

### KEY FINDINGS

- The TAA portfolio earned an inflation-adjusted 10.8% over the aggregate period (102.1 years), whereas a comparable passive index earned a lesser 6.7% (one with a similar standard deviation, a 75/25 global stock/bond mix).
- TAA's performance advantage resulted even after subtracting unusually high transaction costs from the TAA portfolio, while assuming that the comparable passive index could rebalance each month cost-free.
- The TAA portfolio's greater relative success in achieving the stated investment objective did not diminish with the passage of time. If anything, it may have improved during the most recent period (14.3% of the cases examined drawn from the data spanning 1919–2021).

### ABSTRACT

I present a tactical asset allocation proof-of-concept portfolio. It is intended to harvest the non-IID statistical attributes of stocks, bonds, commodities, and currencies, both domestic and international. It has as its objective to benefit from markets' propensity to trend from month to month and during both bull and bear market environments. The proof-of-concept portfolio relies on a simple quantitative rule that allows for rigorous evaluation over the past 102.1 years. The results presented herein suggest that Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA) is an approach worthy of consideration. Moreover, the article suggests that a necessary condition for TAA success lies in correctly specifying its rather differentiated investment objective—one that may be unrelated to comparisons with popular fixed-weight index benchmarks. Such fixed-weight benchmarks have correlations with TAA strategies that are so low as to make commonly used statistical comparisons irrelevant (i.e., not statistically significant). This article attempts to correct our industry's mischaracterization and overpromising of all things TAA by focusing on the time required for success.

**T**actical Asset Allocation (TAA) earned a poor reputation over the past 13 years (since 3/6/2009, the recent bear market low). My objective is to mitigate a portion of the retail industry's TAA skepticism. This is an interesting topic, given the size of the retail industry, TAA's prominence within it, and forecasted future growth in TAA's market share. Direct and indirect, the retail industry is large and growing, currently estimated to be more than \$16 trillion.<sup>1</sup> TAA first came into existence back in the 1980s and has grown consistently ever since, with occasional faster growth

<sup>1</sup>Sources: ICMA (International Capital Market Association) analysis using Bloomberg Data (August 2020), Ned Davis Research, and The Visual Capitalist (<https://www.visualcapitalist.com>).



and modest shrinkage, strongly associated with S&P 500 bear and bull market cycles, respectively. Today, assets under management within retail TAA strategies are measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars.<sup>2</sup>

Retail skepticism is an outgrowth of TAA's failure to meet investor/adviser expectations. My argument is that this failure is the fault of investors/advisers who adopted incorrect performance expectations for TAA and/or specific TAA managers who relied excessively on forecasts and predictions of the future based on subjective human judgment (or overly complex forecasting/prediction models).

I attempt to support this argument by presenting a new investment performance objective for TAA strategies and a proof-of-concept TAA portfolio designed to reliably meet this objective. The proposed differentiated performance goal is an outgrowth of the investor's desire to meet their own specific future needs as opposed to the investment industry's desire to just sell more product. My objective is not to provide a guide on how to build a successful TAA portfolio; that is a worthy topic, but one that requires a book instead of a brief article. Instead, my objectives are to demonstrate the case for TAA, suggest a possible direction, and strongly recommend that success requires correctly setting the appropriate performance objective (which is not to beat some third-party passive index benchmark).

## BACKGROUND

No widely accepted definition of TAA exists within the institutional or retail investment industries. Nevertheless, products proliferate and have grown significantly since first introduced by Bill Fouse and his firm Mellon Capital (founded back in 1983). For those professionals fully cemented within the investment industry, TAA is a little like "art": they know it when they see it. But a widely accepted definition eludes us. For the purposes of this article, I am defining retail TAA strategies as those portfolios that exhibit the following characteristics:

- They are built using commingled vehicles and/or derivatives (as opposed to individual stocks or individual bonds).
- Size of factor or asset class bets is significantly above average.
- Frequency with which the bets are changed is significantly above average.
- Tracking to blended benchmarks consisting of passive indices is exceedingly low.
- Tax efficiency is remarkably poor.
- Modest but relatively dependable bear market mitigation is expected for bear markets lasting at least 8 months.
- They suffer from occasional whipsaw risk.
- They are delivered in the format of a separate account, 1940 Act fund, or insurance subaccount.

Two representative examples of such retail TAA portfolios include the \$40 billion of TAA products offered by F-Squared, Wellesley, MA (now defunct for unrelated reasons) and the well-respected Nationwide variable annuity Mozaic Index product line.

Since the bear market low set back on midday March 6, 2009, the S&P 500 as measured by SPY returned +823% and the 7/10-year Treasury as measured by IEF earned +57% (through midday 1/4/2022). Few if any TAA strategies have fared well against these comparative returns. In their study, Morningstar, Inc., examined the "net

<sup>2</sup>Sources: Investment Company Institute; YCharts; Morningstar; BlackRock, Inc.; and the Insurance Information Institute.

# I don't want to lose it all . . . not now

This becomes the defining element . . .

Especially given today's ultra-high uncertainty



- Worked hard
- Built a nest egg
- Not willing to lose it now
- BUT
  - Also not willing to have it nibbled all away over the next “35 years” by
    - Taxes
    - Inflation
    - Fees

# Motivation is not return . . . it's risk . . . the what ifs

- Euro war
- Taiwan war
- 2<sup>nd</sup> pandemic . . . future variants
- Inflation returns to 14%
- Interest rates return to 16 ½%
- Oil hits \$200
- P/E ratio (Price/Earnings ratio) returns to its 1981 level . . . . stocks fall -60%
- Return of a political “Andrew Jackson” type environment
  - Cut government in half
  - Shut down monetary authorities
  - No more immigrants
  - We get an incredibly serious DEPRESSION

For more information contact



Jeff Megar, CFA  
Email [jeff.megar@julexcapital.com](mailto:jeff.megar@julexcapital.com)  
Office 781-772-1378



Liam Flaherty  
Email [liam.flaherty@julexcapital.com](mailto:liam.flaherty@julexcapital.com)  
Office 781-489-5398

# Tactical asset allocation in a rising interest rate environment

Friday

April 29<sup>th</sup>

11:00 a.m. EASTERN

All data and statistics were provided by Global Financial Data, Inc. and NDR, Inc. (unless otherwise indicated in the exhibit)

This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. This is not a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. You must do your own due diligence and consult a professional investment advisor before making any investment decisions. The use of a proprietary technique, model or algorithm does not guarantee any specific or profitable results. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. The performance data presented are gross returns, unless otherwise noted.

The risk of loss in trading securities can be substantial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of your financial condition. All information posted is believed to come from reliable sources. We do not warrant the accuracy or completeness of information made available and therefore will not be liable for any losses incurred.

Some part of the investment performance shown is HYPOTHETICAL. It is based on the back tests of historical data. Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program.

One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

The composition of a benchmark index may not reflect the manner in which a Julex portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, investment holdings, portfolio guidelines, restrictions, sectors, correlations, concentrations, volatility, or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time.

No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made or that all assumptions used to construct the performance provided have been stated or fully considered.