JULEXCAPITAL

Investment scams past & present

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"A man's vanity tells him what is honor; a man's conscience what is justice."

Walter Savage Landor



Investment scams past & present

Why this is important


Why discuss scams and deceptions?



- They've always been with us
- They're here today
- They'll be here tomorrow
- Human nature
- Let's at least admit the truth . . . and attempt to mitigate today's deceptions

Investment scams have always been with us





A New York City swindler tries to cheat a man from the country, 1868.

Investment scams have always been with us





But why?

Three factors must be present for scams/deceptions to continue

Presence of lions - those who

- Actively engage in deception
- Lost their moral compass, forgetting that "ya can't just make stuff up"

Presence of sheep - those who

- Seek the next get-rich-quick scheme
- Base decisions on past returns (real or imagined)

Unwillingness to ask 3 simple questions and demand 3 simple answers

- Why does it exist?
- Why will it work?
- Why are the answers adequate?

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- Charles Ponzi 1920
- The Florida land boom and bust of the 1920s
- Ivar Kreuger (The Match King hoax of 1929/32)
- Ivan Boesky (trading on insider information about future corporate takeovers)
- Bre-X Mining (Michael de Guzman, 1997, fake gold mine)
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Charles Ponzi - 1920





Y-SIX PAGES.

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PONZI PLACED UNDER ARREST

Boston Man Called Advertising Catspaw for International Group.

RECEIVERSHIP IS ASKED

BOSTON, Aug. 12.—Charles Ponzi, alleged financial wizard, today surrendered to the United States marshal and a warrant for his arrest is being prepared.

District-Attorney Gallagher said Ponzi had surrendered because he felt himself unable to carry out promises he had made for the redemption of his notes tomorrow.

At the time Ponzi gave himself

Precip Pow Red


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The Florida land boom and bust of the 1920s









Ivar Kreuger (The Match King hoax of 1929/32)










- Enron, 7th largest U.S. corporation (Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, 2001)
- WorldCom (Bernard Ebbers, largest U.S. accounting fraud, \$100 billion loss)
- Tyco International (Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz)
- HealthSouth (Largest U.S. healthcare provider, accounting fraud)
- Bernie Madoff
- Tom Petters (hedge fund scam)
- Allen Stanford (Standard International Bank, fictional client statements, 2009)

Enron, 7th largest U.S. corporation (Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, 2001) **JULEX**CAPITAL







WorldCom (Bernard Ebbers)




stock peaks at \$64.50.

2001: WorldCom lays off about 6,000 workers.

April 2002: Ebbers

resigns as CEO.

June 2002: WorldCom announces 17,000 layoffs; stock drops below \$1; SEC files fraud charges after company admits inflating earnings by \$3.8 billion. Investigation later estimates an \$11 billion fraud.




Jan. 25, 2005: Ebbers' fraud trial opens.



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Tyco International (Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz)









- One saying comes to mind: "If it's too good to be true, it probably is"
- Any opportunity offering potentially high returns . . . is expected to come with a commensurate higher level of risk this is one reason why the very high, quick returns offered by Ponzi, should have sent alarm bells ringing
- Experts had warned regulators about the unlikelihood of Madoff's relatively high, steady, long-term returns as long ago as 1999 sadly, the warnings were not taken seriously



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- One of my NYC foundation clients invested in Madoff. I was their hired investment consultant. Fortunately, I strongly recommended against Madoff in an exhaustive memo to the Foundation's board. They went ahead anyways, why?
 - Hubris Greed Herding
 - Overconfidence
 Need to get-rich-quick



• We want to say that it is the responsibility of the SEC (and other regulators) to keep us safe as investors

• That is so wrong . . . it is our own responsibility to keep ourselves safe

• By falsely claiming that it is the SEC's duty . . . and failing to accept responsibility for our own actions . . . we guarantee inevitable failure



Why do we fall for scams and deceptions?

Behavioral biases

Laziness

Nine primary behavioral biases - That cause us to make poor decisions





Expecting to find high returns with low risk



Making decisions without considering all implications



Taking undue risk in one area and avoiding rational risk in another



Seeking to reduce risk, but simply using different sources



Anchoring

Relating to the familiar experiences, even when inappropriate



Copying the behavior of others even in the face of unfavorable outcomes



Treating errors of commission more seriously than errors of omission

Media Response

Tendency to react to news without reasonable examination

Optimism

Belief that good things happen to me and bad things happen to others

Nine primary behavioral biases - That cause us to make poor decisions





Expecting to find high returns with low risk



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
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Tendency to react to news without reasonable examination



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Next get rich quick scheme - Today's offenses



- Crypto currencies
- SPACS
- Meme stocks



DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT,, JUST BUY THE STOCKS I TELL YOU TO......" TRUST ME"



ம்று இதை star, Leonardo DiCaprio plays a stock broker in the movie, "The Wolf of Wall Street"







"It Must End Badly" - Munger Says Market Resembles Dot Com Bubble, Calls SPACs "Shit"



BY TYLER DURDEN

WEDNESDAY, FEB 24, 2021 - 03:29 PM

Warren Buffett's "No. 2" spoke during the annual meeting of the Daily Journal Corporation, the Los Angeles newspaperpublishing company chaired by Munger. The 97-year-old Charlie Munger is best known for his work as Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, where he has served as Buffett's right hand man for decades. And like Buffett, Munger has a soft spot for newspapers and legacy media companies, and thus took time out of his (busy?) week to answer questions from Daily Journal shareholders in a meeting broadcast live online (watch recording below).










Exhibit 5: The SPAC boom has continued in early 2021 as of February 18, 2021



Source: Dealogic, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research







Private digital currencies

Crypto crap

Crypto crap



Just think Beanie Babies

You don't need to think about anything else

• Just keep repeating "Bennie Babies" . . . again and again



For internal use only, do not share with chemis or prospec

Why are governments so concerned with crypto?



- Loss of monetary policy
- Loss of seigniorage
- Loss of global reserve currency
- Loss of tax revenue
- Support of criminal element
- Loss of threat to foreign nations that misbehave
- Financial stability





- Loss of monetary policy
- This is why governments will inevitably make crypto illegal

- Loss of seigniorage
- Loss of global reserve currency
- Loss of tax revenue
- Support of criminal element
- Loss of threat to foreign nations that misbehave
- Financial stability





An important distinction, scam vs bubble

Important, different . . . but yet having many similarities



- For <u>Tesla</u> to justify its current valuation . . . it needs to innovate and dominate far far into the future
- In a way that more than matches Amazon
- That's a seriously big ask
- More alarmingly, Tesla is that rare example of a bubble that burst and then reinflated
- Bitcoin is another
- When two such phenomena come along at once . . . the most likely explanation lies in the conditions and psychology surrounding them . . . and not in Tesla and Bitcoin themselves
- This is seriously <u>bad</u>

The US stock market today






For the only thing that matters at the end of the day is Fed liquidity which again drove the latest rally:



Highest market valuation ever: \$47.23 trillion. Widest disconnect from the economy ever: 207.7% market cap vs GDP.



Tesla is not the problem . . . it just demonstrates the problem





But as long as markets don't mind valuations don't matter.

For participants have caught on by now that the only time markets truly correct on a quarterly time frame is when QE ends somewhere:



• The salesman (the successful salesman) . . . always always tells the truth

• The con man . . . he, always makes stuff up . . . then asks you to believe his fabrications







Why discuss scams and deceptions?



- They've always been with us
- They're here today
- They'll be here tomorrow
- Human nature

- Let's at least admit the truth . . . and attempt to mitigate today's deceptions
- <u>But also</u> . . . some incorrectly believe that the U.S. is safer from scams/deceptions than international
- This is not true . . . as well demonstrated by history



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Bottom line

What's to be done

The bottom line



Don't invest on

- Past returns
- Stories
- Get rich quick schemes
- Exciting stories (today meme, SPACs, Crypto)

Do invest on

- Good folk
- Good organizations
- Logical approaches
- No black boxes . . . instead seek flawless transparency

Always ask and then adequately answer

- Why does it exist?
- Why will it work?

For more information contact





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What will my client earn on their bond portfolio . . .

Why this is important

Friday, November 5th at 11:00 a.m. EASTERN

Important Disclosures



All data and statistics were provided by Global Financial Data, Inc. (unless otherwise indicated in the exhibit)

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One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

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