
# JULEXCAPITAL

# Setting logical performance objectives

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# Setting logical performance objectives

Beat a benchmark . . . or achieve life-goals?



# Setting logical performance objectives

Beat a benchmark . . . or achieve life-goals?

Maybe it's a bit of both?

#### What performance objective should be used?



- What's your value prop?
- You charge a fee . . . and in exchange, deliver value
- What's your value?

• So select a set of performance objectives that . . . enhance your ability to deliver on your value prop

#### But your client needs three questions answered



- Am I OK
- Are you earning your fee
- Do we need to make any changes
- In figuring out how best to address these . . .
  - Use tools that enhance your value prop
  - Avoid tools that confuse, distract from, or undermine your value prop

### Possible measures - to answer your client's questions



- S&P 500
- Several of the most popular benchmarks
- Custom fitted benchmark exactly matching client portfolio's asset mix
- Peer universe
- Specific comparative portfolio(s)
- Constant return . . . 5%, 6%, 7%
- No benchmark
- Compare to spending requirements over the next "25 years"

#### Possible venues - to answer your client's questions



- Quarterly client statement
- Written report you prepare and send them
- Annual (or more frequent) client meetings

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Chart 7: Record percentage of SPX market cap held by just 5 stocks



Source: BofA Global Research, Bloomberg

#### Should I suppress benchmarks on client statements



- If benchmarks appear in custodial statements
- The client can only conclude
  - You put them there
  - They must be important
  - They must be the best possible measure for determining success/failure
- Are they relevant
- Now you look like an idiot
- Now you've powerfully undermined your value prop
- Purge them from your quarterly custodial statements
  - SEC absolutely does not require or expect them
  - FINRA discourages them . . . sort of



Even industry watchdog <u>FINRA</u> nudges investors away from using returns as a measuring stick. On its website, <u>FINRA provides investors with a guide for interviewing a broker</u>, and the only place where returns come up is to warn against brokers that tout high returns:

"Be cautious of any investment professional who promises you above-average account performance or says you'll be making risk-free investments. Nobody can guarantee that your investments will grow at a particular rate or that you won't lose money."

When we spoke with FINRA's vice president of investor education, Gerri Walsh, she echoed that sentiment, saying that "focusing on past performance can get you into a danger zone."


#### If you compare to a performance benchmark . . .



- If you compare to a performance benchmark . . .
- Then you're saying . . . that the difference is important
- But, is it?
- Or . . . did you just make something up?



## Determinants of Portfolio Performance



#### So, if you draw conclusions based on the last 1-7 years




- So, if you are encouraging your client to draw conclusions based on the last
  - 1 year
  - 3 years
  - 5 years
  - 7 years
- Then you are probably encouraging them to focus on pure <u>NOISE</u>

#### But your client needs three questions answered




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


## Portfolio 2009




#### And it plays to the most destructive behavioral attributes









#### To maximize our value added . . . we most overcome the carnival barkers





## And break the destructive link with performance chasing






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
#### Break the link . . . It is so destructive





#### Break the focus on past performance





### A focus on past performance has never worked

-30.3%

-1.5%



| 1999             | 2000       | 2002            | 2003             | 2007             | 2008           | 2011           | 2012             | 2015       | 2016       |
|------------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| MSCI             | Russell    | Bloomberg       | MSCI             | MSCI             | Bloomberg      | Bloomberg      | MSCI             | S&P 500    | Russell    |
| Emerging         | 2000 Value | Barclays        | Emerging         | Emerging         | Barclays       | Barclays       | Emerging         | Growth     | 2000 Value |
| Markets<br>66.8% | 22.8%      | Aggregate 10.3% | Markets<br>55.8% | Markets<br>39.4% | Aggregate 5.2% | Aggregate 7.8% | Markets<br>18.2% | 5.5%       | 31.7%      |
| Russell          | Bloomberg  | Bloomberg       | Russell          | MSCI             | Bloomberg      | Bloomberg      |                  |            | Russell    |
| 2000             | Barclays   | Barclays        | 2000             | World ex         | Barclays       | Barclays       | Russell          | S&P 500    | 2000       |
| Growth           | Aggregate  | High Yield      | Growth           | USA Stocks       | High Yield     | High Yield     | 2000 Value       | LargeCap   | SmallCap   |
| 43.1%            | 11.6%      | -1.4%           | 48.5%            | 12.4%            | -26.2%         | 5.0%           | 18.1%            | 1.4%       | 21.3%      |
| S&P 500          | S&P 500    | MSCI            | Russell          | S&P 500          | Russell        | S&P 500        | S&P 500          | Bloomberg  | S&P 500    |
| Growth           | Value      | Emerging        | 2000             | Growth           | 2000 Value     | Growth         | Value            | Barclays   | Value      |
|                  |            | Markets         | SmallCap         |                  |                |                |                  | Aggregate  | Value      |
| 28.2%            | 6.1%       | -6.2%           | 47.3%            | 9.1%             | -28.9%         | 4.7%           | 17.7%            | 0.6%       | 17.4%      |
| MSCI             | Russell    | Russell         | Russell          | Russell          | Russell        | S&P 500        | Russell          | Russell    | Bloomberg  |
| World ex         | 2000       | 2000 Value      | 2000 Value       | 2000             | 2000           | LargeCap       | 2000             | 2000       | Barclays   |
| USA Stocks       | SmallCap   | 2000 value      | 2000 Value       | Growth           | SmallCap       | Luigecup       | SmallCap         | Growth     | High Yield |
| 27.9%            | -3.0%      | -11.4%          | 46.0%            | 7.1%             | -33.8%         | 2.1%           | 16.4%            | -1.4%      | 17.1%      |
| Russell          | Bloomberg  | MSCI            | MSCI             | Bloomberg        | S&P 500        | S&P 500        | MSCI             | MSCI       | S&P 500    |
| 2000             | Barclays   | World ex        | World ex         | Barclays         | Growth         | Value          | World ex         | World ex   | LargeCap   |
| SmallCap         | High Yield | USA Stocks      | USA Stocks       | Aggregate        |                |                | USA Stocks       | USA Stocks |            |
| 21.3%            | -5.9%      | -15.8%          | 39.4%            | 7.0%             | -34.9%         | -0.5%          | 16.4%            | -3.0%      | 12.0%      |
| S&P 500          | S&P 500    | Russell         | S&P 500          | S&P 500          | S&P 500        | Russell        | S&P 500          | S&P 500    | Russell    |
| LargeCap         | LargeCap   | 2000            | Value            | LargeCap         | LargeCap       | 2000           | LargeCap         | Value      | 2000       |
|                  |            | SmallCap        | 24.00/           | 5.50/            |                | Growth         | 16.00/           | 2.40/      | Growth     |
| 21.0%            | -9.1%      | -20.5%          | 31.8%            | 5.5%             | -37.0%         | -2.9%          | 16.0%            | -3.1%      | 11.3%      |
| S&P 500          | MSCI       | S&P 500         | Bloomberg        | S&P 500          | Russell        | Russell        | Bloomberg        | Russell    | MSCI       |
| Value            | World ex   | Value           | Barclays         | Value            | 2000           | 2000           | Barclays         | 2000       | Emerging   |
|                  | USA Stocks |                 | High Yield       |                  | Growth         | SmallCap       | High Yield       | SmallCap   | Markets    |
| 12.7%            | -13.4%     | -20.9%          | 29.0%            | 2.0%             | -38.5%         | -4.2%          | 15.8%            | -4.4%      | 11.2%      |
| Bloomberg        | S&P 500    | S&P 500         | S&P 500          | Bloomberg        | S&P 500        | Russell        | S&P 500          | Bloomberg  | S&P 500    |
| Barclays         | Growth     | LargeCap        | LargeCap         | Barclays         | Value          | 2000 Value     | Growth           | Barclays   | Growth     |
| High Yield       |            |                 |                  | High Yield       |                |                |                  | High Yield |            |
| 2.4%             | -22.1%     | -22.1%          | 28.7%            | 1.9%             | -39.2%         | -5.5%          | 14.6%            | -4.5%      | 6.9%       |
| Bloomberg        | Russell    | S&P 500         | S&P 500          | Russell          | MSCI           | MSCI           | Russell          | Russell    | MSCI       |
| Barclays         | 2000       | Growth          | Growth           | 2000             | World ex       | World ex       | 2000             | 2000 Value | World ex   |
| Aggregate        | Growth     |                 |                  | SmallCap         | USA Stocks     | USA Stocks     | Growth           |            | USA Stocks |
| -0.8%            | -22.4%     | -23.6%          | 25.7%            | -1.6%            | -43.6%         | -12.2%         | 14.6%            | -7.5%      | 2.8%       |
| Russell          | MSCI       | Russell         | Bloomberg        | Russell          | MSCI           | MSCI           | Bloomberg        | MSCI       | Bloomberg  |
| 2000 Value       | Emerging   | 2000            | Barclays         | 2000 Value       | Emerging       | Emerging       | Barclays         | Emerging   | Barclays   |


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-14.9%

2.7%







Myth 4: Advisors can beat the market. One of the biggest misconceptions investors have is they think an advisor will help them outperform the market or know when to get them out of a bear market, Kinniry says. "That is really hard to do."

Advisors know that chasing "the next best investment" rarely pays off, says Daren Blonski, principal at Enso Wealth Management in Sonoma, California. "Investors end up moving their money around and miss the benefit of having their money appreciate with expected market returns," Blonski says. "The rule of thumb for successful investors should be invest in quality, lowcost, diversified investments and stay in for the long term."



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A financial advisor can act as your saving or behavior coach, he says, encouraging you to save more or helping you navigate volatile market swings, like those during the dot.com collapse or the global financial crisis, that might require staying the course.



# So, what's to be done?

Focus on the original mutually agreed upon objectives


Answer the client's three questions . . . before they ask them






## Isn't about advisors helping clients identify and make specific those goals












# The brilliance of "buckets"

Or what I call "Time Segmentation Investing"



- Time Segmentation Investing is about only one thing
- Moving from uncertainty to certainty



#### Time Segmentation Investing - two powerful benefits



#### Client

- Behavior modification
- Patience
- Making "time" your friend
- Breaking the dysfunctional/slavish focus and reliance on benchmark comparisons
- Encourages measurement of what really matters
  - What do I need to earn
  - How much time do I have to earn it
  - Is this reasonable/logical given today's valuations and opportunities

#### Investments

- Different investments have radically different "maturation cycles"
- Size of the investment opportunity is often directly associated with the length of the maturation cycle



• "If your plan is for 1 year, plant rice. If your plan is for 10 years, plant trees. If your plan is for 100 years, educate children."

- This proverb's lesson for investments is three-fold:
  - Every goal . . . has a specific time destination in the future
  - The best solution . . . for each time destination is different
  - Investors . . . must bring the required patience to any investment . . . giving it the time it requires to sprout, grow, mature, and eventually be harvested




If your plan is for 1 year, plant rice



Ultra-diversified U.S.-Dollar bond portfolio with an average effective duration < 4.3 years

• If your plan is for 10 years, plant trees



Global tactical asset allocation based on a fully-transparent, testable, quantitative set of rules

• If your plan is for 100 years, educate children



Distressed private debt and private venture capital structured inside an illiquid limited partnership



#### **Structural example - Time Segmentation Investing**

|  | Time segment 1   | Time segment 2          | Time segment 3                      | Time segment 4                     | Time segment 5      |
|--|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Serves investor needs that arrive this number of years in the future | 0 to 5 years   | 5 to 10 years           | 10 to 15 years                      | 15 to 20 years                     | More than 20 years  |
| Minimum required net return  | 3%   | 4%                      | 5%                                  | 6%                                 | 7%                  |
| Destination (this number of years in the future)                     | 2 ½ years  | 7½ years                | 12 ½ years                          | 17 ½ years                         | 22 ½ years          |
| Invested in  | Bond Portfolio   | Short-Term<br>Portfolio | Moderately Short-<br>Term Portfolio | Moderately Long-<br>Term Portfolio | Long-Term Portfolio |
| Policy asset allocation  | 100% bonds with average effective duration < 4.3 years | 62% to 75% bonds        | 50% to 59% stocks                   | 75% stocks                         | 100% stocks         |

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#### Bucket approach - traditional concept





Bucket 1
Years 0 to 5
100% bonds



Bucket 2
Years 6 to 10
"25% stocks"



Bucket 3
Years 11 to 15
"50% stocks"



Bucket 4
Years 16 to 20
"75% stocks"



Bucket 5
Years 21 and Greater
100% stocks



- Use buckets . . . . Time Segmentation Investing with 100% of my clients
- Help prospects who don't want it . . . to find a more comfortable adviser
- Suppress benchmarks from quarterly custodial statements
- In every client meeting
  - Refresh mutually agreed upon goals
  - Measure past progress towards those goals
  - Identify future required progress to achieve stated goals
  - Interpret what is required in the future . . . In the context of today's
    - Opportunities
    - Risks

#### But your client needs three questions answered



- Am I OK
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- In figuring out how best to address these . . .
  - Use tools that enhance your value prop
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Never lose sight . . . it's all about these few items . . . their questions and your value prop . . . don't make it more complicated by comparing to the S&P 500, that's just plain lose/lose

#### For more information contact





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One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

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