JULEXCAPITAL

A better way to obtain small cap exposure

Rob Brown, PhD, CFA

Julex Capital Advisory Board Member, Website www.robbrownonline.com



40 Grove Street, Suite 140, Wellesley, MA 02482
Phone 781-489-5398
Email info@julexcapital.com
Web www.julexcapital.com

Why now and is the juice worth the squeeze



Why now

- Relative valuations, large cap vs small cap
- The problem with technology, it's a large cap problem
- Current small cap risk premium bear market is long in the tooth
- Historically, the small cap risk premium has been positive after a recession

• Is the juice worth the squeeze

Average small cap risk premium bull market delivers an extra +163%

Two challenges to overcome




- Two possible impediments to a successful implementation
- Zombies
- Multiple risk premia



- Successful forest management
- Consider the unqualified need for regular and periodic controlled forest fires
 - While it may sound counterproductive to the average person
 - Controlled burns are actually the safest way to manage overgrowth and promote new, healthy growth in wooded areas, wetlands, crop fields and prairies
 - Controlled burns get rid of dead timber and brush, which can easily catch fire and spread an uncontrolled wildfire more easily.





Zombies span geographies





13% of the world's companies are 'zombies.' That's not healthy





By Matt Egan and Julia Horowitz, CNN Business
Updated 7:55 AM ET, Sun March 31, 2019



New York (CNN Business) – 1. Easy money: The past decade of ultra-low interest rates has spawned the rise of "zombie" companies.

These debt-laden firms don't make enough to even cover their interest payments. That's never a good sign.

The number of zombie companies in advanced economies last year stood at 536, or 13% of the total, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Zombies feeding off of COVID-19 stimulus



ECONOMY

COVID-19 is Making the Zombie Company Problem

Worse

Yet many governments continue to support, and in some cases, even bail out these companies. Unfortunately, government subsidies that prop dying businesses up only delay the inevitable, as evidenced by what's occurring in Europe...

Via The New York Times,

"About nine million European workers, up to a fifth of those currently enrolled in the short-work programs, are in what the German bank Allianz has called "zombie jobs" — positions in the auto and airline industries, restaurants, shops and hotels and other sectors ill equipped to confront shifting consumer behavior. Many of these jobs are still on the books almost solely because of government subsidies, the bank said."


Deloitte sounded the horn on Canada's zombie companies two years ago to the day.

According to a Financial Post article published in September 2018,

"...a new report from Deloitte ... found that at least 16 per cent of [Canadian] publicly traded firms ... could be classified as "zombies" — defined as mature firms more than 10 years old that lack sufficient revenue to cover interest payments on their debt."




Percentage of U.S. 'zombie' firms



Data: Datastream, Worldscope, DB Global Research; Chart: Axios Visuals









iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF (IWN)




Multiple risk premia

Are you looking at one or multiple risk premia, all packaged up together



Small cap premium of 1.19% per year over the last 94.22 years





Historical premiums and returns (annualized): US, Developed ex US, and Emerging Markets

Company Size

Relative performance of small cap stocks vs. large cap stocks (%)





Dimensional US Small Cap Index was created by Dimensional in March 2007 and is compiled by Dimensional. It represents a market-capitalization-weighted index of securities of the smallest US companies whose market capitalization falls in the lowest 8% of the total market capitalization of the Eligible Market. The Eligible Market is composed of securities of US companies traded on the NYSE, NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and Nasdaq Global Market. Exclusions: non-US companies, REITs, UITs, and investment companies. From January 1975 to the present, the index excludes companies with the lowest profitability and highest relative price within the small cap universe. The index also excludes those companies with the highest asset growth within the small cap universe. Profitability is measured as operating income before depreciation and amortization minus interest expense scaled by book. Source: CRSP and Compustat. The index monthly returns are computed as the simple average of the monthly returns of 12 subindices, each one reconstituted once a year at the end of a different month of the year. The calculation



Dimensions of Expected Returns

Historical premiums and returns (annualized): US, Developed ex US, and Emerging Markets

Company Size

Relative performance of small cap stocks vs. large cap stocks (%)

Relative Price

Relative performance of value stocks vs. growth stocks (%)

Profitability

Relative performance of high profitability stocks vs. low profitability stocks (%)



Zeroing in on the profitability risk factor






Relative performance of high profitability stocks vs. low profitability stocks (%)







AQR's perspective on rewarded risk factors



Styles investing (also known as factor investing or smart beta) refers to the application of systematic investment themes that have historically provided long-term positive returns with low correlation to each other.

The underlying AQR Funds in the Styles Model Portfolios use a combination of styles to access return sources – generally preferring cheap, improving, higher-yielding, higher-quality assets over peers:

	Equities	Fixed Income	Commodities	Alternatives
Market	~	~	~	
Volatility				~
Value	~	~	~	✓
Momentum	✓	~	~	~
Carry		~	~	~
Defensive/Quality	~	~		~
Trend	~	~	~	~



AQR's perspective on rewarded risk factors - for equities



Styles investing (also known as factor investing or smart beta) refers to the application of systematic investment themes that have historically provided long-term positive returns with low correlation to each other.

The underlying AQR Funds in the Styles Model Portfolios use a combination of styles to access return sources – generally preferring cheap, improving, higher-yielding, higher-quality assets over peers:

	Equities
Market	✓
Value	~
Momentum	✓
Defensive/Quality	~
Trend	~



Rob's perspective on the small cap risk premium



The benefit is big, but episodic

Now is the time

- Relative valuations
- Technology
- Current small cap risk premium bear market is seriously long in the tooth

Zombies

- Are real
- Big issue
- Do <u>not</u> index your exposure
- A "profitability" filter solves the problem

• Simultaneous multi-factor exposure

- Tremendous synergy between the small cap risk premium and the "profitability" factor
- Always combine them into one unified, inseparable whole


Rob's perspective on the small cap risk premium, continued



- AQR goes too far
- They've rejected the small cap risk premium due to its pronounced episodic nature
 - I get it . . .
 - But, they've thrown out the baby with the bath water
- The bear/bull cycles are there, and the payoffs are too large to ignore



History of bear & bull markets for the small cap risk premium since 1926





Bull markets for the small cap risk premium

Cumulative return

Duration

Typical (median)

215.9%

6.7 years

Longest bull

94.1%

12.0 years


Most bountiful bull

259.2%

6.8 years



Average bull market delivers an extra +163% return over and above the return on stocks (large cap)



Rob's perspective on accessing the small cap risk premium



- Combine small cap with a synergistic quality/profitability overlay
- Value versus growth is a different issue

Use a purely quantitative approach

- Why?
- Because its testable
- The testing allows you to understand how the strategy will behave in different environments



The Julex approach to small cap

A testable quantitative solution to accessing the small cap risk premium with a synergistic profitability/quality overlay



Firm Overview

- Employee-owned, established 2012
- Quantitative, rules-based investment process
- Strategy Focus:
 - Tactical strategies limit loss
 - O Quantitative equity strategies generate alpha
- Experienced Team
 - O Institutional investment experience
 - o Portfolio management team includes 3 Ph.D.'s
- GIPS compliance verified by ACA Performance Services

Julex - the investment professional team



Team	Role	Experience	Education
Henry Ma Ph.D., CFA	President Chief Investment Officer	Geode Capital – Hedge Fund Manager Loomis Sayles – Director of Quantitative Research Fortis Investments - Director of Quantitative Research Sun Life Financial– Portfolio Manager	Ph.D. Economics – Boston University BA, MA – Peking University
George Xiang Ph.D., CFA	Portfolio Manager Research	State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) – Head of Quantitative Research Loomis Sayles – Senior Quantitative Analyst Conseco Capital – Quantitative Research Manager	Ph.D., Mathematics – Purdue University BA – Nankai University
Frank Zhuang Ph.D.	Portfolio Manager Research	Ericsson – Senior Engineer Nortel, Alcatel/Lucent - Senior Research Scientist	Ph.D. Electric Engineering – University of Maryland MS – West Virginia University
Jeffrey Megar CFA	Investment Committee Member	F-Squared Investments – Senior Vice President State Street Global Advisors – Senior Portfolio Manager Fortis Investments – Senior Portfolio Manager Cypress Tree Investment Management	MBA – Northeastern University BA – Framingham State University
Liam Flaherty	Research	MFS Investments - Independent Contractor MassMutual - Internship	BA – Babson College
Bo Wang	Research		Ph.D. Candidate, Economics – Boston College BA – Renmin University of China

For internal use only, do not share with clients or prospects



Strategy Highlights

- Outperform Small Cap Index Russell 2000 Value/Blend Index
- Hold 25-35 undervalued high-quality stocks
- High active share and tracking error with a potentially high alpha



Three-Factor Sequential Screening Model

- Stocks are screened sequentially by three factors
 - 1. Proprietary valuation
 - 2. Profitability
 - 3. Leverage
- No bias to size, value or momentum

Focused Portfolio

- 25-35 undervalued, highly profitable and highly stable stocks
- High Alpha with lower drawdown
- High active share and monthly tracking error

Market Cap Weighted Portfolio

• Maximum individual stock weight, 10%

Objective: 2-5% excess return with 6% tracking error



Three-Factor Sequential Screening Model

- Stocks are screened sequentially by three factors
 - 1. Proprietary valuation
 - 2. Profitability
 - 3. Leverage
- No bias to size, value or momentum

Focused Portfolio

- 25-35 undervalued, highly profitable and highly stable stocks
- High Alpha with lower drawdown
- High active share and monthly tracking error


Market Cap Weighted Portfolio

• Maximum individual stock weight, 10%

Objective: 2-5% excess return with 6% tracking error




Russell 2000



Yields portfolio of 25-35 high quality undervalued securities



Russell 2000




Each of these three active selection levels, serves to remove the Zombies

Yields portfolio of 25-35 high quality undervalued securities



Russell 2000



These last two active selection levels, serve to overlay the desired synergistic profitability/quality factor


Yields portfolio of 25-35 high quality undervalued securities

Julex - the small cap strategy, continued



Top 10 Holdings (3/31/2020)

Stock	Portfolio Weights
Lithia Motors	8.1.%
Cohen & Steers, Inc.	7.9%
SeaWorld	6.4%
National General Holdings Corp.	5.9%
National Beverage Corp.	5.9%
Crocs, Inc.	5.4%
Gray Television	5.3%
PriceSmart	5.1%
Artisan Partners Asset Management	4.4%
USANA Health Sciences, Inc.	4.3%



Portfolio Characteristics


March 31, 2020	Portfolio	iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF		
# of Securities	25	1,393		
Market Capitalization	1,305.6	1,634.1		
Active Share	98.8			
Dividend Yield	2.2	3.3		
Price/Earnings	9.9	10.1		
P/E using FY1 Est	9.5	10.7		
P/E using FY2 Est	8.5	9.7		
Est 3-5 Yr EPS Growth	20.0	9.0		
Price/Cash Flow	5.2	4.7		
Price/Sales	0.5	0.5		
ROE	29.0	5.6		
Operating Margin	12.67	14.22		
Net Margin	6.94	10.31		

A concentrated portfolio of high-quality stocks which are 'undervalued' relative to their fundamentals.

Julex - the small cap strategy, backtest hypothetical performance



Jan. 1990-March 2018	TrueAlpha TM Small Cap	Russell 2000 Index	Morningstar Small Cap Value
Annual Return	22.1%	9.6%	10.5%
Standard Deviation	20.3%	18.9%	15.9%
Sharpe Ratio	0.95	0.36	0.48
Maximum Drawdown	-47.6%	-52.9%	-54.6%
Information Ratio	1.29		



Note: The performance results of the TrueAlpha Small Cap strategy shown on this slide are HYPOTHETICAL based on modeled results and are gross before investment management fees. Data Source: FactSet, Thomson Reuters, Julex Capital Management.

	m TM	D # 6000	Morningstar
X 7	TrueAlpha TM	Russell 2000	Small Cap
Year	Small Cap	Index	Value
1990	16.1%	-20.4%	-14.0%
1991	54.9%	45.6%	37.4%
1992	40.0%	17.5%	20.2%
1993	50.8%	18.7%	17.3%
1994	9.4%	-1.9%	-0.6%
1995	43.0%	28.8%	22.2%
1996	19.0%	17.0%	22.1%
1997	17.9%	22.3%	28.9%
1998	9.4%	-0.3%	-6.4%
1999	38.5%	25.6%	6.0%
2000	61.8%	-9.6%	18.6%
2001	0.0%	1.7%	15.0%
2002	-9.4%	-20.5%	-10.8%
2003	52.0%	48.5%	42.2%
2004	25.8%	19.1%	20.9%
2005	6.4%	4.6%	6.6%
2006	22.5%	18.4%	16.5%
2007	-6.8%	-1.6%	-6.2%
2008	-28.2%	-33.8%	-32.5%
2009	44.3%	27.2%	29.9%
2010	41.8%	26.9%	25.7%
2011	15.0%	-4.2%	-4.3%
2012	28.9%	16.4%	16.0%
2013	63.3%	38.8%	36.2%
2014	11.0%	4.9%	3.3%
2015	0.5%	-4.4%	-7.0%
2016	24.7%	21.3%	25.7%
2017	27.1%	14.7%	9.1%
2018 Jan-Mar	2.6%	-0.1%	-2.8%



Julex Capital Management, LLC Daily Performance Distribution 9/28/2020

strategy returns are gross of management fees unless otherwise stated

Benchmark/Strategy Composite	Inception	DTD	MTD	QTD	YTD	Since Inc (Ann.)
Benchmark: Russell 2000®		2.41	-3.21	5.08	-8.56	0.88
Benchmark: Russell 2000 Value®		3.01	-4.09	3.16	-21.08	-5.65
TrueAlpha Small Cap	4/1/2018	1.66	-3.15	6.85	-4.87	6.65
excess Russell 2000		-0.75	0.06	1.78	3.69	5.77
excess Russell 2000 Value		-1.35	0.94	3.69	16.21	12.30



Julex Capital Management, LLC Daily Performance Distribution 9/28/2020

strategy returns are gross of management fees unless otherwise stated

Benchmark/Strategy Composite	Inception	DTD	MTD	QTD	YTD	Since Inc (Ann.)
Benchmark: Russell 2000®		2.41	-3.21	5.08	-8.56	0.88
Benchmark: Russell 2000 Value®		3.01	-4.09	3.16	-21.08	-5.65
TrueAlpha Small Cap	4/1/2018	1.66	-3.15	6.85	-4.87	6.65
excess Russell 2000		-0.75	0.06	1.78	3.69	5.77
excess Russell 2000 Value		-1.35	0.94	3.69	16.21	12.30



Friday, Oct 9th at 11am Eastern

The case for high current yield stocks









Jeff Megar, CFA Email jeff.megar@julexcapital.com Office 781-772-1378

Brian Phelan Email brian.phelan@julexcapital.com Cell 508-527-1431

Bob Peatman
Email bob.peatman@julexcapital.com
Cell 617-875-9316

Important Disclosures



All data and statistics provided by Global Financial Data, Inc. at www.globalfinancialdata.com Large cap stocks are represented by the S&P 500. Small cap stocks are represented by the Russell 2000 index and before its inception by the Fama French small cap index (market cap weighted) for the smallest 30% of the market. Technology is defined by ticker symbol XLK. Dimensional Fund Advisors, LLC provided the comparative historical returns across different geographies.

This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. This is not a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. You must do your own due diligence and consult a professional investment advisor before making any investment decisions. The use of a proprietary technique, model or algorithm does not guarantee any specific or profitable results. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. The performance data presented are gross returns, unless otherwise noted.

The risk of loss in trading securities can be substantial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of your financial condition. All information posted is believed to come from reliable sources. We do not warrant the accuracy or completeness of information made available and therefore will not be liable for any losses incurred.

Some part of the investment performance shown is HYPOTHETICAL. It is based on the back tests of historical data. Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program.

One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

The composition of a benchmark index may not reflect the manner in which a Julex portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, investment holdings, portfolio guidelines, restrictions, sectors, correlations, concentrations, volatility, or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time.

No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made or that all assumptions used to construct the performance provided have been stated or fully considered.