



A better way for obtaining your value tilt

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- Conventional wisdom prescribes a permanent fixed tilt towards value
- This conclusion is based on the following assumptions about the value risk premium
 - Sufficient size
 - Sufficient consistency
 - Some diversification benefit
- Convention wisdom is wrong
- It lacks even the slightest degree of consistency, and instead is painfully episodic

We showed that conventional wisdom is wrong

- The value premium exists
- It's large and spans all geographies (US, international, and EM)
- Unfortunately . . . It is strongly episodic
- Moreover, it's diversification properties are chaotic

But, why now


Valuations

Comparative fundamental valuations, continued

	Growth (large cap)	Value (large cap)
Price/earnings ratio	25.8	16.4
Price/book ratio	4.6	2.0
Return on equity	22.4%	16.4%
Earnings per share growth rate	19.1%	12.5%
PEG ratio (P/E divided by earnings growth)	1.35	1.31
Dividend yield	0.68%	2.82%
Technology weighting	24.0%	10.7%

Statistics as of September 30, 2020


Based on earnings yield, value is the cheapest in 19 years



But, why now

Technology, very similar to the 2000 bear market


Value risk premium is random (noisy) during S&P 500 bear markets



FANMAG to blame


The main culprits of Growth's recent surge are a handful of mega-cap Growth stocks. The six FANMAG stocks posted gains similar to our composite of four widely accepted bubbles over the past one, three, and five years **(chart, right)**.

FANMAG following bubble trajectory



FANMAG - a classic bubble, continued

Record high FANMAG P/E and P/S




FANMAG valuations


The rally in FANMAG stocks has left them expensive. The price/earnings and price/sales ratios for FANMAGs are at record highs **(chart, left)**.

But, why now

The current value bear market is long in the tooth

Bear markets for the value risk premium have been both severe and long-lasting





But, why now

The ten largest names in the S&P 500 Index are 82% technology

82% of the ten largest S&P 500 names are technology (by weight)

Apple	Berkshire Hathaway
Microsoft	Johnson & Johnson
Amazon	Procter & Gamble
Alphabet	Visa
Facebook	NVIDIA


Excluding the largest companies on a global basis

Just leaving out the single largest company has historically added **+0.22%** per year⁷ over and above the relevant index fund. If instead, one excluded the ten largest companies, the resulting portfolio outperformed by **+0.46%** per year⁷. In contrast, if one excluded the single largest company in each country, the resulting portfolio outperformed the comparable index fund by **+0.35%** per year⁷.

Just here in the U.S.

In the U.S., once a company becomes one of the ten largest, its future performance underperforms by a wide margin⁸.

Periods after a company first became one of the ten largest stocks




But, why now

Last week, a question was posed . . . *“Are higher future interest rates an added reason?”*


Bear markets for the value risk premium have been both severe and long-lasting




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
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
Bull markets for the value risk premium have been both bountiful and long-lasting



Bull markets for the value risk premium have been both bountiful and long-lasting




Bull markets for the value risk premium have been both bountiful and long-lasting




NDR suggests it is not interest rates, but economic growth

Decelerating economic growth favors Growth



Since cyclical Value stocks are tied to the economy and many Growth stocks can generate EPS growth regardless of economic conditions, Growth has tended to outperform Value when economic growth has been decelerating (**chart, left**).

**The case for value, in
general and right
now**



**High dividend stocks
as a best possible
expression of value**

- Current income
- Zombie filter
- Sustainability
- Profitability
- Growing income
- Tangibles vs intangibles


- Current income
- Zombie filter
- Sustainability
- Profitability
- Growing income
- Tangibles vs intangibles

With interest rates so low, we have a need for current income

- Solution
- Build out a value portfolio centered on high current income

And, dividend paying stocks are the most undervalued in 18 years

Dividend Payers cheap vs Non-Payers



With so much free money, zombies are proliferating

- By some estimates, 19% of all US companies are zombies
- Any value portfolio must filter out prospective zombies
- One more reason to emphasize high current income

Sustainability - the curse of any high income portfolio

- Portfolios built to emphasize high current income
- Must avoid the trap of sustainability
- Appropriate filters must be engaged

Profitability - a dependably rewarded factor

Profitability

Relative performance of high profitability stocks vs. low profitability stocks (%)



- Ideally, we reflect the profitability factor within our high current income value portfolio


- Historically, dividend paying stocks have meaningfully outperformed non-dividend paying stocks
- But more important . . . Stocks with growing dividends have outperformed even more
- Ideally, a portfolio emphasizing high current income will also seek growing income and therefore growing dividends

- Campbell R. Harvey
- Report of Value's Death May Be Greatly Exaggerated
- SSRN working paper, August 2020
- Harvey, Arnott, Kalesnik, Linnainmaa


The world has changed

Shift from manufacturing to a service-based economy means that traditional book value has become less relevant.

What are intangibles?




Value portfolios must not be based on book value, continued



Value portfolios must not be based on book value, continued

Ignored by simple “Book Value”



Julex provides a superior solution

High Dividend Strategy - A better expression of value

- **Employee-owned, established 2012**
- **Quantitative, rules-based investment process**
- **Strategy Focus:**
 - Tactical strategies – limit loss
 - Quantitative equity strategies - generate alpha
- **Experienced Team**
 - Institutional investment experience
 - Portfolio management team includes 3 Ph.D.'s
- **GIPS compliance verified by ACA Performance Services**

The investment professionals

Team	Role	Experience	Education
Henry Ma Ph.D., CFA	President Chief Investment Officer	Geode Capital – Hedge Fund Manager Loomis Sayles – Director of Quantitative Research Fortis Investments - Director of Quantitative Research Sun Life Financial– Portfolio Manager	Ph.D. Economics – Boston University BA, MA – Peking University
George Xiang Ph.D., CFA	Portfolio Manager Research	State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) – Head of Quantitative Research Loomis Sayles – Senior Quantitative Analyst Conseco Capital – Quantitative Research Manager	Ph.D., Mathematics – Purdue University BA – <u>Nankai</u> University
Frank Zhuang Ph.D.	Portfolio Manager Research	Ericsson – Senior Engineer Nortel, Alcatel/Lucent - Senior Research Scientist	Ph.D. Electric Engineering – University of Maryland MS – West Virginia University
Jeffrey Megar CFA	Investment Committee Member	F-Squared Investments – Senior Vice President State Street Global Advisors – Senior Portfolio Manager Fortis Investments – Senior Portfolio Manager Cypress Tree Investment Management	MBA – Northeastern University BA – Framingham State University
Liam Flaherty	Research	MFS Investments - Independent Contractor MassMutual - Internship	BA – Babson College
Bo Wang	Research		Ph.D. Candidate, Economics – Boston College BA – Renmin University of China

High Dividend & Excess Return


- Expected 4-5% dividend yield
- Outperform Russell 1000 Index over the long run
- Semi-Annual Rebalanced: Mar/Sep.

Quantitative and Disciplined Approach


- Model driven investment process
- No emotional bias

Robust and Consistent Factors

- Consistent dividend
- Quality companies




- Current income
- Profitability
- Growing income
- Tangibles vs intangibles



- Maximum 15 stocks in each sector
- Maximum 6 stocks in each industry
- Four Groups: Financial, Cyclical, non-cyclical and commodity-related

**Select a portfolio of 25 stocks
with the highest dividend scores**

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Dividend score} \\ &= (\text{universal ranking} \\ &+ \text{group ranking} + \text{sector ranking}) / 3 \end{aligned}$$



The portfolio - Sep 30, 2020


Symbol	Company	Sector	Industry	Yield	Weight
MRK	Merck & Co Inc	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	2.81	4%
KO	Coca-Cola Co	Consumer Defensive	Beverages - Non-Alcoholic	3.28	4%
PFE	Pfizer Inc	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	4.06	4%
NVS	Novartis AG	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	3.56	4%
CSCO	Cisco Systems Inc	Technology	Hardware	3.38	4%
ABBV	AbbVie Inc	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	5	4%
SNY	Sanofi SA	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	3.4	4%
BBL	BHP Group PLC	Basic Materials	Metals & Mining	6.11	4%
GSK	GlaxoSmithKline PLC	Healthcare	Drug Manufacturers	5.14	4%
MMM	3M Co	Industrials	Industrial Products	3.57	4%
RIO	Rio Tinto PLC	Basic Materials	Metals & Mining	6.13	4%
EMR	Emerson Electric Co	Industrials	Industrial Products	2.85	4%
PAYX	Paychex Inc	Industrials	Business Services	3.25	4%
K	Kellogg Co	Consumer Defensive	Consumer Packaged Goods	3.3	4%
LYB	LyondellBasell Industries NV	Basic Materials	Chemicals	6.14	4%
MXIM	Maxim Integrated Products Inc	Technology	Semiconductors	2.77	4%
STX	Seagate Technology PLC	Technology	Hardware	5.49	4%
NTAP	NetApp Inc	Technology	Hardware	4.12	4%
PKG	Packaging Corp of America	Consumer Cyclical	Packaging & Containers	3.02	4%
SNA	Snap-on Inc	Industrials	Industrial Products	2.85	4%
HBI	Hanesbrands Inc	Consumer Cyclical	Manufacturing - Apparel & Accessories	3.86	4%
INGR	Ingredion Inc	Consumer Defensive	Consumer Packaged Goods	3.15	4%
NATI	National Instruments Corp	Technology	Software	2.87	4%
MSM	MSC Industrial Direct Co Inc	Industrials	Industrial Distribution	4.46	4%
MCY	Mercury General Corp	Financial Services	Insurance	5.6	4%
Total				4.0	100%

Fundamental portfolio characteristics

	High Dividend Stock Portfolio	Vanguard Russell 1000 Index Fund
# of Securities	25	1,009
Market Capitalization	70,871.1	409,136.0
Active Share	96.2	--
Dividend Yield	4.0	1.7
Price/Earnings	15.7	26.7
P/E using FY1 Est	14.2	24.3
P/E using FY2 Est	13.3	20.7
Est 3-5 Yr EPS Growth	5.4	12.8
Price/Cash Flow	10.5	13.8
Price/Book	3.7	3.5
Price/Sales	1.8	2.4
ROE	29.6	23.5
ROA	11.16	9.34
Port. MPT Tracking Error	10.50	--
Port. MPT Beta	0.92	1.00
Port. MPT Volatility	32.04	33.21

Back tested performance history - Showing what you want to see

March 2006-June. 2020	High Dividend Portfolio	Russell 1000 Index	MSCI High Dividend Index
Annual Return	12.0%	8.7%	8.6%
Standard Deviation	14.2%	15.3%	13.8%
Sharpe Ratio (risk free rate =0%)	0.84	0.57	0.62
Maximum Drawdown	-41.2%	-51.1%	-50.1%
Dividend Yield	4.32%	2.03%	3.44%




Year	High Dividend Portfolio	Russell 1000 Index	MSCI High Dividend Index
2006 (Mar. – Dec)	17.8%	12.1%	17.7%
2007	15.0%	5.8%	0.0%
2008	-25.6%	-37.6%	-27.6%
2009	31.8%	28.4%	18.4%
2010	19.8%	16.1%	15.9%
2011	7.2%	1.5%	14.3%
2012	16.6%	16.4%	10.6%
2013	30.1%	33.1%	28.9%
2014	15.7%	13.2%	14.9%
2015	2.3%	0.9%	0.7%
2016	17.4%	12.1%	16.3%
2017	24.2%	21.7%	19.5%
2018	-3.6%	-4.8%	-2.3%
2019	25.1%	31.4%	22.5%
2020 (Jan - Jun)	-5.9%	-2.8%	-11.4%

Note: The performance results shown on this slide are HYPOTHETICAL based on back test modeled results and are gross returns before investment management fees.

Data Source: FactSet, Julex Capital Management, Gurufocus

Back tested performance history - Showing what you want to see

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2019	25.1%	31.4%	22.5%
2020 (Jan - Jun)	-5.9%	-2.8%	-11.4%

And for Q3, the portfolio earned **+6.2%** versus the High Dividend Index at **+3.8%**

Note: The performance results shown on this slide are HYPOTHETICAL based on back test modeled results and are gross returns before investment management fees.

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
Friday, Oct 23rd at 11am Eastern

Today, are bonds an “investment” or just a “speculation”?

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Important Disclosures

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One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

The composition of a benchmark index may not reflect the manner in which a Julex portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, investment holdings, portfolio guidelines, restrictions, sectors, correlations, concentrations, volatility, or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time.

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