

JULEX CAPITAL

The case for tactical asset allocation

Rob Brown, PhD, CFA

Julex Capital Advisory Board Member, Website www.robrownonline.com




40 Grove Street, Suite 140, Wellesley, MA 02482

Phone 781-489-5398

Email info@julexcapital.com

Web www.julexcapital.com


60/40 portfolio defined - sometimes called a “balanced portfolio”




Well diversified across the stocks of 500 prominent U.S. corporations

Well diversified across intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bonds and high-quality investment grade U.S. corporate bonds

60/40 portfolio has delivered consistent long-term success



Bear markets have been both severe and long-lasting



Bonds play a vital role within the 60/40 portfolio


**Partially offset
stock losses
during bear
market**

PRIMARY role of bonds
in a larger portfolio

Current income

SECONDARY role of bonds
in larger portfolio

When interest rates rise





When interest rates fall



Why the 60/40 portfolio works so well


**Stocks collapse
during periodic bear
markets**



**Interest rates generally
decline during bear markets,
driving bond prices higher**


An example of past success - bonds play a vital role

Bear market of 2000 - Aug 2000 to Sept 2002



A second example of past success - bonds play a vital role

Bear market of 1939 - Sept 1939 to Apr 1942



But the world is different today - and not in a small way



Interest rates are at an all-time record low, never before seen

If interest rates rise, bonds can't play their necessary role

Bond prices will rise or fall by the following amounts depending on the direction interest rates take

Change in interest rates (from current levels)	10-year U.S. Treasury bond	30-year U.S. Treasury bond
-25bps	+2%	+6%
+25bps	-2%	-6%
+50bps	-5%	-12%
+100bps	-10%	-25%
+200bps	-19%	-49%
+250bps	-24%	-61%


Based on where interest rates stood on August 19, 2020
Assumes an instantaneous change in the level of interest rates, i.e., overnight

BEST case scenario - Your 60/40 portfolio losses -20%

Stocks collapse
during modest bear
market



Stocks
fall -35%




Earn +2 ½%
on your
bonds

Bonds deliver their
current yield plus very
slight price appreciation

WORST case scenario - Your 60/40 portfolio losses -35%


Stocks collapse
during robust bear
market



Bonds
lose -20%




The current bull market is long in the tooth



The next bear market is closer than one might think - continued



Stocks are richly priced relative to the U.S. economy (GDP)




One of the very best bond funds

Vanguard Long-Term Investment Grade Bond Fund
(VWESX)


14.2%	year to date (through Aug 23rd)
22.5%	over last year
9.9%	per year, last 5 years
8.6%	per year, last 10 years
8.7%	per year, since inception (more than 37 years)

Returns other than year-to-date are as of July 31, 2020

Past performance is explained, primarily by declining interest rates



Where has great performance come from . . . since late-1981



One of the very best bond funds

Vanguard Long-Term Investment Grade Bond Fund (VWESX)

14.2%	year to date (through Aug 23rd)
22.5%	over last year
9.9%	per year, last 5 years
8.6%	per year, last 10 years
8.7%	per year, since inception (more than 37 years)

Returns other than year-to-date are as of July 31, 2020

But terrible downside risk . . . when interest rates rise

Change in interest rates (from current levels) Vanguard Bond Fund (VWESX)

-25bps	+4%
+25bps	-4%
+50bps	-8%
+100bps	-15%
+200bps	-31%
+250bps	-38%

Based on where interest rates stood on August 23, 2020
Assumes an instantaneous change in the level of interest rates, i.e., overnight

What issues define the environment today and over the next 15 years

Govt Deficit

Large and rapidly growing

Abandonment of fiscal discipline or prudence

Gigantic future entitlement programs

Inflation

Rising inflationary expectations

Precious metals prices setting new record highs

Interest rates

Large increases

Expectations for rising rates many years into the future

U.S. Dollar

Falling U.S. Dollar

Growing dependence on other nations funding our deficits

Politics

Political turmoil

Rise of polarizing factions


Tribalism

U.S. federal government debt held by the public


Ignores and excludes all debt held by the Federal Reserve, Social Security Administration, and all other government trust funds or Government accounts

Assumes the U.S. Treasury will be able to borrow any amount of money, forever, at an average 2.6% interest rate


Assumes no economic recessions



The U.S. Federal Reserve is printing money at an accelerating pace



Gold prices have started to rise again, much as they did back in 1967



What issues defined the 15 years from 1967 through 1982

Govt Deficit

Large and rapidly growing

Abandonment of fiscal discipline or prudence

Gigantic future entitlement programs

Inflation

Rising inflationary expectations

Precious metals prices setting new record highs

Interest rates

Large increases

Expectations for rising rates many years into the future

U.S. Dollar

Falling U.S. Dollar

Growing dependence on other nations funding our deficits


Politics

Political turmoil

Rise of polarizing factions

Tribalism

How did the 60/40 portfolio perform during the 15 years 1967-1982



Potential remedies for the future failure of 60/40 portfolios

Tactical asset allocation

While strictly avoiding predicting market direction or turning points

Extremely patient, bottom-up stock picking

Maintaining dry-powder in ultra-short Treasuries

Ownership of commercial real estate

Bricks & mortar

Active bond picking

Virtually impossible to offer a commercially viable product

Pros and cons for each possible solutions

MOST likely to succeed

LEAST likely to succeed

Tactical asset allocation (sector rotation)

- Continuously adapts and aligns with the changing environment
- Greatest opportunity to enhance returns and mitigate bear market collapse
- Hunts cross the entire range of possible asset categories

- Does not track any performance index
- Terribly tax inefficient
- Fails miserably in the short-run (e.g., three or four years)

Patient bottom-up stock picking (deep value with dry-powder)

- Tremendous outperformance opportunity for the patient investor
- Based on the common sense logic of *"Buying \$1 worth of assets for 50¢"*

- Requires a full market cycle (one complete bull and bear market)
- Does not track any performance index
- Greater week-to-week volatility

Private non-traded real estate (bricks & mortar)

- Potential to earn attractive premiums by accepting the risks associated with illiquidity, manager-skill, and specific property-types

- Rising cap rates pose a serious threat
- High hidden expense ratios
- Requires unusually restrictive manager screening and selection processes
- Fails to get you out of stocks

Active bond picker (mutual fund)


- Opportunity at three distinct levels: asset-class, sector, and individual issuer

- Virtually impossible to offer a commercially viable mutual fund following such a strategy
- Successful active bond managers pursuing such an objective quickly turn into tactical asset allocators
- Fails to get you out of stocks

For more information contact



Jeff Megar, CFA
Email jeff.megar@julexcapital.com
Office 781-772-1378



Brian Phelan
Email brian.phelan@julexcapital.com
Cell 508-527-1431



Bob Peatman
Email bob.peatman@julexcapital.com
Cell 617-875-9316

Friday, Sept 18th at 11am Eastern

The general . . . why have confidence in TAA strategies

The specific . . . why and in what ways Julex offers a superior TAA solution

- If I told you that I had investment manager "A" who returned

Annualized returns net of fees for large cap stock manager "A"

1 year	3 years	5 years	7 years	10 years	12 years
20.9%	24.3%	27.5%	20.8%	17.8%	19.3%

- If I told you that I had investment manager "B" who returned

Annualized returns net of fees for large cap stock manager "B"

1 year	3 years	5 years	7 years	10 years	12 years
-0.4%	14.9%	-0.9%	3.5%	4.1%	1.2%

- BUT . . .
- These are the same manager
- And you are all using this manager

- It is the U.S. stock market

Annualized returns net of fees for large cap stock manager "A"

1 year	3 years	5 years	7 years	10 years	12 years
20.9%	24.3%	27.5%	20.8%	17.8%	19.3%

Returns are as of market close on November 30, 1999

Annualized returns net of fees for large cap stock manager "B"

1 year	3 years	5 years	7 years	10 years	12 years
-0.4%	14.9%	-0.9%	3.5%	4.1%	1.2%

Returns are as of market close on May 31, 2012

- Instead . . . I have two different U.S. stock managers with LONG track records

Annualized returns net of fees for two U.S. stock managers

	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	35 years
Manager "C"	14.5%	15.2%	9.5%	6.3%	9.7%	11.2%
Manager "D"	7.7%	11.5%	7.3%	6.9%	8.2%	9.2%


Returns are as of market close on August 31, 2020

- **When we look at an investment manager**
 - What if any importance should we place on their last 12 or more years of performance?
 - Or their track records for the last 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, or even 35 years?
 - How then do we honestly evaluate a strategy such as TAA?

For more information contact



Jeff Megar, CFA
Email jeff.megar@julexcapital.com
Office 781-772-1378



Brian Phelan
Email brian.phelan@julexcapital.com
Cell 508-527-1431



Bob Peatman
Email bob.peatman@julexcapital.com
Cell 617-875-9316

This information in this presentation is for the purpose of information exchange. This is not a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. You must do your own due diligence and consult a professional investment advisor before making any investment decisions. The use of a proprietary technique, model or algorithm does not guarantee any specific or profitable results. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. The performance data presented are gross returns, unless otherwise noted.

The risk of loss in trading securities can be substantial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light of your financial condition. All information posted is believed to come from reliable sources. We do not warrant the accuracy or completeness of information made available and therefore will not be liable for any losses incurred.

Some part of the investment performance shown is HYPOTHETICAL. It is based on the back tests of historical data. Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program.

One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the presentation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.

The composition of a benchmark index may not reflect the manner in which a Julex portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, investment holdings, portfolio guidelines, restrictions, sectors, correlations, concentrations, volatility, or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time.

No representation or warranty is made to the reasonableness of the assumptions made or that all assumptions used to construct the performance provided have been stated or fully considered.

Important Disclosures - continued

All data and statistics were provided by www.globalfinancialdata.com, www.vanguard.com, and www.cbo.gov on August 30, 2020

Stocks throughout this document are defined to be the S&P 500 Index

Bonds throughout this document are defined to a portfolio consisting of 16.667% GFD Indices USA 10-year Government Bond Total Return Index, 16.667% USA 5-year Government Note Total Return Index, 16.667% USA 3-year Government Note Return Index, 25% GFD Indices USA Total Return AAA Corporate Bond Index, and 25% Dow Jones Corporate Bond Return Index. This portfolio is rebalanced monthly at month-end

The 60/40 portfolio uses the above definitions for stocks and bonds and is rebalanced monthly at month-end

Inflation is measured by the All-Urban, Not-Seasonally Adjusted, Consumer Price Index

The expected change in the price of a bond or a portfolio of bonds, for given changes in the level of interest rates, is based on current duration (for that bond or portfolio of bonds) and assumes an instantaneous (i.e., overnight) change in the level of interest rates

Managers "A", "B", and "C" are the S&P 500 total return index

Manager "D" is the Russell 2000 total return index